Quartermasters can also fight the devils

Chapter 792: The Soviet Union’s Thoughts on Sending Troops

As the war situation in Europe and the Pacific became clearer, the Soviet government, at the Yalta Conference that determined the future fate of the Far East, when talking about the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway in Northeast China, made it very clear to the then-living US President Row that these areas in Northeast China were once the rights and interests of Tsarist Russia.

Moreover, the Soviet government even openly stated in the secret agreement on the Far East at the Yalta Conference that "all rights and interests originally belonging to Russia that were destroyed by Japan's treacherous attack in 1904 will be restored."

The substantive political demands put forward by the Soviet government at the Yalta Conference showed the Soviet government's desire for China's Northeast region. After the Japanese government announced its surrender, the Soviet government confidently linked its declaration of war on the Japanese government with the Russo-Japanese War. Not only did Soviet newspapers repeatedly emphasize this point, but the Soviet leader also specifically mentioned this point in his speech on the day of the Japanese surrender signing ceremony.

Afterwards, Marshal Vasilevsky, commander-in-chief of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, also visited the cemetery of Tsarist Russian imperial officers and soldiers who died in the Port Arthur Fortress during the Russo-Japanese War, saluted at the tomb and laid a wreath. This meaningful move further demonstrated the real purpose of the Soviet government's sending troops to Northeast China.

The strategic goal of the Soviet government in participating in the war against the Japanese Kwantung Army was not only to destroy Japan's military power in Northeast China, nor was it simply to retaliate against Japan for its defeat in the previous Russo-Japanese War.

The main goal of the Soviet government was to restore Tsarist Russia's sphere of influence in the Far East, especially in Northeast China. This goal could only be achieved by defeating Japan's Kwantung Army in Northeast China, and it could only be achieved after the Soviet army's own participation in the war and defeating the Japanese Kwantung Army.

Because of this, sending troops to China's northeast region to participate in the war against Japan's Kwantung Army can be considered as the Soviet government's established strategic policy in the Far East.

You know, since the outbreak of the full-scale war with Japan, the Chinese government has been eager for the Soviet army to participate in the fight against the Japanese army, but the Soviet leaders have repeatedly rejected the Chinese government's request.

However, by the end of 1942, the situation had changed greatly. The progress of the Battle of Stalingrad allowed the Soviet government to see the dawn of victory. At this time, the Soviet leaders also began to consider the problems in the Far East. Subsequently, the Soviet government clearly stated at the Tehran Conference that the Soviet army would participate in the fight against the Japanese army.

Especially after the successful explosion of the United States' atomic bomb in Hiroshima, Japan, President Du of the United States and Prime Minister Qiu of England even believed that a better outcome might be if the Soviet Union had not participated in the war against Japan.

However, the Soviet leaders could not wait to propose at the Potsdam Conference that the Soviet government believed that the best way was for the United States, the Soviet Union and other allies fighting in the Far East to formally ask the Soviet Union to participate in the war against the Japanese army, so that the Soviet army would have a legitimate reason to fight.

After hearing the words of the Soviet leader, the first thing that came to President Du of the United States was "the irony of the diplomatic trend." President Du of the United States knew that the Soviet government was finally going to reap the fruits of victory at the last moment of the war.

Although President Du of the United States was very reluctant to the Soviet government's proposal, his reluctance would not in the slightest affect the decision of the Soviet leader who believed in the principle of power diplomacy.

The Soviet leaders obviously believed that whether the Soviet government had a reasonable diplomatic excuse was no longer relevant. With the current powerful strength of the Soviet army, the Soviet government could take back all the rights and interests that Tsarist Russia had in the Far East forty years ago, especially in China, and even more.

The irony here is that the Soviet army’s target in the Far East was Japan’s Kwantung Army, but the real and greatest interest that the Soviet government wanted to pursue in the Far East was China.

In fact, this issue is also very clear, because after the Soviet army defeated the Japanese Kwantung Army, the countries that had a say in the international Far East issues were mainly the United States and China, while the United States was a strong country and China was a weak country.

Therefore, if the Soviet Union wants to obtain rights and interests in the Far East, then the Soviet government’s diplomatic strategy must be to obtain the rights and interests that the Soviet government needs from the Chinese government through cooperation and competition with the United States.

As the war drew to a close, the Soviet and American governments were secretly discussing politics and diplomacy, and China's status was largely just a bargaining chip between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet head and British Prime Minister Qiu easily divided their respective spheres of influence in the Balkans on a piece of paper. Relying on their military strength on the European battlefield, they determined the post-war fate of many European countries such as Poland, Greece and Finland with the United States and England. Therefore, when the Soviet government sought rights and interests in the Far East, it also relied on the principle of military strength diplomacy.

However, because the previous conditions were not yet mature, or the Soviet army at that time did not have sufficient strength, although the Soviet leaders expressed interest in the Far East as early as 1942, they had never put forward specific conditions for the Soviet army to participate in the war.

At the Tehran Conference, although the Soviet leaders had not yet clearly put forward the political conditions for the Soviet Union to send troops to the Far East, they only expressed their approval for the future internationalization of Dalian Port in Northeast China. However, this also indicated the beginning of the Soviet Union's struggle for interests in the Far East.

In 1944, the war situation in Europe underwent fundamental changes. The Allied forces successfully landed in Normandy, and the Soviet army began to push the war out of its own territory. The collapse of Germany had become a foregone conclusion. However, with the development of the situation on the European battlefield, the problems in the Far East became more prominent. At the same time, the strategic goals of the Soviet leaders in the Far East became increasingly clear and specific.

Starting from December 1944, the Soviet head and President Romania of the United States began secret talks on the Far East issues at the Yalta Conference behind the back of the Chinese government. Most of the content of the talks involved the sovereignty and interests of the Chinese government in the Far East.

On June 30, 1945, the Soviet government and the Chinese government began formal negotiations. However, the negotiations between the Soviet government and the Chinese government were extremely difficult. Although they had gone through repeated bargaining, the Chinese government delegation had to make concessions on many major issues.